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Abstract	Naturalistic	philosophers	rely	on	literature	search	and	review	in	a	number	of	ways	and	for	different	purposes.	Yet	 this	article	 shows	how	processes	of	 literature	 search	and	 review	are	likely	to	be	affected	by	widespread	and	systematic	biases.	A	solution	to	this	problem	is	offered	 here.	 Whilst	 the	 tradition	 of	 systematic	 reviews	 of	 literature	 from	 scientific	disciplines	has	been	neglected	in	philosophy,	systematic	reviews	are	important	tools	that	minimize	 bias	 in	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 and	 allow	 for	 greater	 reproducibility	 and	transparency.	 If	 naturalistic	 philosophers	 wish	 to	 reduce	 bias	 in	 their	 research,	 they	should	 then	 supplement	 their	 traditional	 tools	 for	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 by	including	systematic	methodologies.						
1.Introduction	Naturalism	 has	 been	 a	 hugely	 successful	 research	 program	 in	 contemporary	 analytic	philosophy.	Naturalistic	philosophers	have	been	following	Quine	(1952)	in	challenging	the	separation	 of	 philosophical	 from	 scientific	 research	 and	 arguing	 that	 philosophy	 and	science	 are	 best	 conceived	 of	 as	 engaged	 in	 essentially	 the	 same	 enterprise,	 pursuing	similar	goals	and	deploying	similar	methods.	Yet,	naturalism	comes	in	different	forms,	and	a	distinction	is	often	made	between	experimental	and	empirical	philosophy	(Prinz	2008;	Rose	and	Danks	2013).			Experimental	 philosophers	 have	 recently	 adopted	methodologies	 from	 the	 behavioural,	social	 and	 cognitive	 sciences	 and	 engaged	 in	 a	 number	 of	 empirical	 projects	 to	 answer	philosophically	 interesting	questions	 (Knobe	and	Nichols	2008;	Alexander	2012;	Sytsma	and	Buckwalter	2016).	Empirical	philosophers	use	 instead	empirical	 results	acquired	by	professional	scientists	in	their	philosophical	theorizing.	Notably,	empirical	philosophy	has	become	extremely	popular	in	several	corners	of	philosophical	research	(Knobe	2015).			Whilst	some	argue	that	empirical	philosophers	should	turn	themselves	into	experimental	philosophers	 (Machery	 and	 O’Neil	 2014),	 others	 have	 expressed	 a	 number	 of	 qualms	about	 the	 project	 of	 experimental	 philosophy	 (Polonioli	 2016;	 Seyedsayamdost	 2015;	
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Carmel	2011).	Here	it	will	be	argued	that	there	would	indeed	be	benefits	for	naturalistic	philosophers	if	they	expanded	their	methodological	toolkit.	However,	the	tools	discussed	here	 are	 not	 those	 typically	 advocated	 by	 experimental	 philosophers,	 but	 rather	 the	systematic	methodologies	 for	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 that	widely	 employed	 in	 the	natural,	life	and	health	sciences.		More	 precisely,	 the	 paper	 presents	 and	 defends	 the	 following	 claims.	 First,	 empirical	philosophers	do	not	philosophize	 in	a	vacuum	and,	 in	 fact,	 rely	on	 literature	 search	and	review	 in	 a	 number	 of	 ways	 and	 for	 several	 purposes.	 Second,	 biases	 and	 cognitive	limitations	are	likely	to	affect	literature	search	and	review	in	many	critical	ways.	Over	the	past	decades,	psychologists	have	described	numerous	ways	in	which	judgment	formation	and	 information	 search	 can	 be	 biased,	 and	 there	 are	 no	 reasons	 to	 doubt	 that	 also	literature	search	and	review	should	be	biased	in	important	ways,	and	even	in	the	field	of	philosophy.	Third,	 scientists	have	 come	 to	widely	 adopt	 systematic	 reviews	 to	minimize	bias	in	the	activity	of	literature	search	and	review,	and	these	tools	should	also	be	of	wide	interest	to	empirical	philosophers.	More	precisely,	systematic	research	review	is	a	highly	structured	 approach	 to	 cumulating	knowledge.	Progress	 in	 knowledge	 acquisition	 is	 the	result	 of	 the	 integration	 of	 efforts,	 and	 literature	 reviews	 are	 vehicles	 for	 summarizing	research.	For	systematic	reviews,	a	clear	set	of	 rules	exists	 for	searching	studies	and	 for	determining	 which	 should	 be	 included	 in	 or	 excluded	 from	 the	 analysis.	 The	reproducibility	of	an	experimental	result	is	a	fundamental	assumption	in	science	and	in	a	similar	fashion	systematic	reviews	aim	to	allow	for	high	reproducibility	of	conclusions	by	minimizing	bias	and	maximizing	transparency.		In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	these	claims	will	be	carefully	discussed,	and	then	combined	to	offer	a	plea	for	a	type	of	minimally	biased	philosophy:	if	naturalistic	philosophers	wish	to	 reduce	 bias	 in	 philosophy,	 as	 it	 is	 here	 assumed	 that	 they	 should,	 then	 they	 should	consider	ways	 to	 supplement	 their	 traditional	 tools	 for	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 by	including	systematic	reviews.			
2.	Empirical	philosophy	and	literature	review	A	 hot	 topic	 in	 metaphilosophy	 concerns	 how	 best	 to	 describe	 the	 methods	 used	 by	philosophers	and	their	practices.	Many	of	the	recent	discussions	on	this	topic	have	focused	on	whether,	 to	what	 extent,	 and	 how	 analytic	 philosophy	 rests	 on	 the	 use	 of	 intuitions	(e.g.,	 Cappelen	 2012;	 Andow	 2016).	 Still,	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 underestimate	 the	
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importance	 of	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 for	 the	 philosophical	 profession,	 at	 least	 in	many	areas	of	philosophical	investigation.			Empirical	 philosophy	 is	 certainly	 a	 case	 in	 point	 here:	 if	 we	 asked	 what	 empirical	philosophers	actually	do	when	they	carry	out	philosophical	research,	a	plausible	answer	could	 not	 help	 but	 mention	 their	 engagement	 with	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 as	 an	important	 aspect	 of	 it.	 As	 Prinz	 put	 it,	 “empirical	 philosophy	works	 by	 citation”	 (2008,	200).	Empirical	philosophers	search	for	and	cite	relevant	empirical	research.	But	there	are	different	types	of	activity	that	require	a	thorough	 literature	review	to	be	conducted,	and	different	uses	of	literature	review	exist.		Empirical	philosophers	use	empirical	findings	to	back	up	their	claims	and	premises.	They	also	often	contribute	to	scientific	 theorizing	by	providing	novel	hypotheses,	synthesizing	swathes	 of	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	 works,	 and	 suggesting	 empirical	 research.	 Most	typically,	empirical	philosophers	cite	neuroscientists	and	psychologists,	but	they	also	call	on	linguists,	evolutionary	biologists,	roboticists,	and	anthropologists,	among	others.			There	are	plenty	of	well-known	works	from	empirical	philosophers.	Yet	mentioning	a	few	paradigmatic	 examples	 might	 be	 helpful	 here.	 For	 instance,	 philosopher	 Andy	 Clark	(2013)	 extensively	 surveyed	 scholarly	 work	 to	 argue	 that	 brains	 are	 fundamentally	prediction-error	minimizing	devices	 trying	 to	 self-generate	 the	sensory	streams	 that	are	currently	arriving	from	the	world.	Further,	philosophers	have	also	appealed	to	empirical	research	 to	 diagnose	 problems	 affecting	 their	 research	 community	 and	 ameliorate	 the	prospects	for	philosophical	research.	In	particular,	Jennifer	Saul	(2013)	linked	the	topic	of	underrepresentation	of	women	 in	philosophy	 to	empirical	 research	on	 implicit	bias.	 She	stresses	 that	 ‘over	 the	 last	 few	decades,	psychologists	have	established	very	 clearly	 that	human	 beings,	 even	 those	who	 hold	 strongly	 egalitarian	 ideals,	 are	 prone	 to	 a	 range	 of	unconscious	biases	against	members	of	groups	that	are	stigmatized	in	certain	areas’	(243).	Moreover,	Jesse	Prinz	(2004)	has	offered	an	up-to-date	version	of	William	James’s	theory	of	 emotion	 that	he	 takes	 to	be	well	 supported	by	 the	wealth	of	 evidence	 from	empirical	psychology	and	neuroscience	that	he	discusses.			Yet	literature	review	can	also	constitute	an	original	and	valuable	piece	of	research	in	itself.	Review	articles	come	in	many	trades	and	different	taxonomies	are	available	as	well:	they	can	 be	 critical,	 literature,	 mapping,	 generic,	 qualitative,	 rapid,	 scoping,	 state-of-the-art,	systematic,	 systematized,	 and	 umbrella	 reviews	 (Grant	 and	 Booth	 2009).	 Some	
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classifications	 follow	 instead	 a	 pragmatic	 approach.	 For	 instance,	 the	 ISI	 Web	 of	Knowledge	Science	Citation	Index	categorizes	a	paper	as	a	review	if	 it	either	(i)	contains	more	 than	100	references;	or	 (ii)	 appears	 in	a	 review	 journal	or	 the	 review	section	of	 a	journal;	or	(iii)	states	in	the	abstract	that	it	is	a	review.1			Review	 articles	 are	 published	 in	 philosophy	 journals	 too.	 For	 example,	 the	 journal	
Philosophy	 Compass	 publishes	 original,	 peer-reviewed	 survey	 articles	 of	 the	 most	important	 research	 from	 across	 the	 entire	 discipline.	 In	 its	 section	 on	 Naturalistic	Philosophy	it	is	possible	to	find	entries	on	topics	such	as	the	“Experimental	Philosophy	of	Aesthetics”	 (Cova	 et	 al.	 2015)	 or	 “Causation:	 Empirical	 Trends	 and	 Future	 Directions”	(Rose	and	Danks	2012).	Rather	than	providing	a	basis	for	the	researchers’	own	endeavors,	this	 type	 of	 literature	 review	 creates	 a	 solid	 starting	point	 for	 all	 other	members	 of	 the	community	that	are	interested	in	a	particular	topic,	and	who	can	refer	to	these	reviews	to	support	 some	of	 their	 claims.	Further,	 if	philosophers	wish	 to	have	 impact	outside	 their	field	too,	it	becomes	advisable	to	have	review	articles	that	present	the	state	of	the	art	on	a	particular	philosophical	topic	and	the	main	results,	so	that	scientists,	policy	makers,	or	any	member	of	a	particular	profession	can	more	easily	become	acquainted	with	the	status	of	a	philosophical	debate	and	avoid	taking	onboard	questionable	assumptions	in	their	practice.	Such	 review	 articles	 can	 also	 prove	 to	 be	 useful	 tools	 for	 teaching	 purposes,	 providing	students	with	a	balanced	treatment	of	a	particular	topic.			
3.	Heuristics	and	biases	in	literature	search	and	review	Empirical	philosophers	rely	on	literature	search	and	review	in	their	philosophical	work.	In	light	 of	 this,	 they	 seem	 to	 face	 a	 number	 of	 possible	 hurdles.	 The	 crisis	 of	 findings’	reproducibility	in	psychology	(Open	Science	Collaboration	2015;	Pashler	and	Harris	2012)	and	other	fields	(Baker	2016)	clearly	highlights	a	number	of	the	relevant	issues.	In	brief,	if	empirical	 philosophers	 base	 their	 philosophical	 work	 on	 findings	 that	 fail	 to	 replicate,	then	 their	 claims	might	 rest	 on	 shaky	 grounds	 too.	 Still,	 there	 are	 other,	 less	 frequently	appreciated,	 problems.	 In	 particular,	what	 empirical	 philosophers	 also	 need	 to	 carefully	consider	 is	 the	 fact	 that	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 constrained	 by	cognitive	 limitations	 and	 vulnerable	 to	 biases.	 Scientists	 sometimes	warn	of	 these	 risks.	For	instance,	Roy	Baumeister	wrote	that:			 Although	 literature	 reviews	 are	 less	 subject	 than	 empirical	 investigations	 to	capitalizing	 on	 chance,	 they	 are	 probably	 more	 susceptible	 to	 the	 danger	 of	confirmation	 bias.	 Many	 good	 literature	 reviews	 involve	 seeing	 a	 theoretical																																																									1	(http://wokinfo.com/	essays/impact-factor/).	
	 5	
pattern	 or	 principle	 in	 multiple	 spheres	 of	 behavior	 and	 evidence,	 and	 putting	together	 such	 a	 paper	 undoubtedly	 involves	 an	 aggressive	 search	 for	 evidence	that	fits	the	hypothesized	pattern.	(1997,	319)					These	considerations	are	not	at	all	untethered.	As	it	turns	out,	over	the	past	five	decades	psychologists	have	documented	many	ways	in	which	our	reasoning	and	decision-making	can	be	 systematically	biased	by	 cognitive,	motivational	 and	affective	 factors	 (Hastie	 and	Dawes	2010).	People	have	been	shown	to	deploy	heuristics	that	in	several	contexts	lead	to	a	number	of	biases	and,	in	turn,	poor	or	ill-grounded	decision-making.			Philosophers	have	been	hugely	 interested	 in	 this	psychological	 literature	 (Samuels	et	 al.	2002;	Lee	et	al.	2013;	Saul	2013;	Polonioli	2014).	Still,	a	point	that	has	not	been	properly	acknowledged	 in	the	philosophical	 literature	 is	 that	 there	are	also	good	reasons	to	think	that	biases	and	cognitive	limitations	might	generally	have	a	huge	and	negative	impact	on	literature	search	and	reviews.	After	all,	literature	search	and	review	are	just	a	specific	case	of	 information	 search	 and	 related	 judgment	 and	decision-making,	where	 the	 latter	 have	been	described	as	riddled	with	biases.	In	brief,	scholars	and	scientists	typically	search	for	relevant	 information,	process	 it,	and	 form	a	number	of	 judgments	about	 the	 information	reviews.	Arguably,	the	same	processes	that	underlie	many	other	instances	of	information	search	and	assessment	are	likely	to	be	at	work	on	these	occasions	as	well.		Search	for	evidence	can	be	biased	in	critical	ways.		An	obvious	and	well-known	bias	is	the	abovementioned	 confirmation	 bias,	 which	 consists	 in	 the	 “seeking	 or	 interpreting	 of	evidence	in	ways	that	are	partial	to	existing	beliefs,	expectations,	or	a	hypothesis	in	hand”	(Nickerson	 1998,	 175).	 When	 people	 seek	 new	 information,	 these	 information	 search	processes	are	often	biased	in	favor	of	the	seekers’	previously	held	beliefs,	expectations,	or	desired	 conclusions.	 For	 example,	 people	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 favor	 information	 that	supports	their	social	stereotypes	(Johnston	1996),	attitudes	(Lundgren	and	Prislin	1998),	expectations	 in	 negotiations	 (Pinkley,	 Griffith	 and	 Northcraft	 1995),	 and	 self-serving	conclusions.	 Arguably,	 if	 a	 researcher	 is	 carrying	 out	 a	 literature	 review	on	 the	positive	psychological	 effects	 of	 holding	 a	 particular	 sort	 of	 belief,	 such	 as	 believing	 in	 free	will,	confirmation	biases	might	result	 in	her	 ignoring	undesired	 information	and	her	 focusing	on	what	seems	to	support	her	previously	held	belief.			Moreover,	consider	research	on	 implicit	biases,	where	the	 latter	are	typically	understood	as	 ‘largely	unconscious	tendencies	 to	automatically	associate	concepts	with	one	another’	(Saul	2013,	244).	Whilst	there	are	still	a	number	of	open	questions	regarding	the	nature	
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and	frequency	of	implicit	biases,	what	seems	to	be	supported	by	copious	evidence	is	that	decision	 makers	 are	 often	 biased	 by	 people’s	 gender,	 ethnic	 background,	 and	 sexual	preference,	 for	 example	 when	 they	 select	 job	 candidates	 based	 on	 CVs,	 and	 also	 by	people’s	 appearance	 (especially	 weight	 and	 height	 in	 relation	 to	 gender)	 when	 they	interview	job	candidates	(Steinpreis	and	Ritzke	1999).	If	these	biases	can	result	in	judging	members	of	stigmatized	groups	negatively,	it	is	not	difficult	to	see	how	they	could	impact	on	the	search	and	assessment	of	scholarly	information.	Research	published	by	researchers	from	particular	groups	might	be	just	ignored	or	its	value	might	be	slighted.2		Further,	consider	how	people	have	been	shown	to	heavily	rely	on	what	is	most	salient	or	available	 information	 to	 them	 in	 their	 judgment	 and	 decision-making	 (Tversky	 and	Kahneman	 1973).	 In	 particular,	 recent	 occurrences,	 because	 they	 are	 cognitively	 more	salient,	 often	 lead	people	 to	misrepresent	 the	probability	 of	 certain	 types	of	 events.	 For	instance,	“the	subjective	probability	of	traffic	accidents	rises	temporarily	when	one	sees	a	car	overturned”	(11).	People	are	apt	to	accept	one	of	two	competing	views	merely	because	they	 heard	 evidence	 supporting	 the	 one	 view	 more	 recently	 (Tversky	 and	 Kahneman	1982).	 In	 light	 of	 this,	 it	 is	 not	 unlikely	 that	 researchers	 trying	 to	 organize	 findings	 in	support	 of	 a	 particular	 hypothesis	 will	 rely	 on	 partial,	 although	 quite	 salient	 or	 easily	accessible,	information.				Finally,	 researchers	attempting	 to	deliver	an	evenhanded	 treatment	of	 the	 literature	are	supposed	 to	 discuss	 which	 views	 are	 more	 and	 less	 widely	 shared.	 But	 evidence	 from	several	 studies	 suggests	 that	 social	 observers	 tend	 to	 perceive	 a	 form	of	egocentric	bias	with	 respect	 to	 the	 relative	 commonness	 of	 their	 responses.	 The	 best-known	 example	comes	from	a	1977	study	in	which	Ross,	Greene	and	House	asked	students	to	walk	around	a	campus	wearing	a	sandwich	board	with	the	word	‘repent’	on	it.	Students	could	agree	to	wear	 the	 board,	 doing	 the	 experimenters	 a	 favor,	 or	 disagree	 and	 participate	 in	 a	 later	study.	Those	who	offered	 to	wear	 the	sign	 (50%)	estimated	 that	more	 than	half	of	 their	peers	would	also	agree	to	do	so	(average	estimation	63.5%).	Those	who	declined	thought	that	about	a	quarter	of	those	asked	would	accept	(average	estimation	23.3%).	Apparently,	students	overestimated	how	similar	others’	preferences	were	to	their	own.	These	findings	might	be	taken	to	suggest,	for	example,	that	researchers	trying	to	assess	the	popularity	of	a	 particular	 view	 or	 account	 might	 produce	 inaccurate	 assessments	 of	 its	 popularity	(Gilovich	1990).																																																										2	The	importance	of	the	topic	of	discrimination	against	authors	has	recently	gained	importance	and	attention	in	philosophy:	http://www.diversityreadinglist.org.	
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	Overall,	 confirmation	 biases,	 salience	 and	 availability	 biases,	 as	 well	 as	 false	 consensus	biases	are	among	the	many	effects	and	distortions	that	might	impact	on	literature	search	and	review.	There	are	no	compelling	reasons	to	assume	that	empirical	philosophers	would	be	 immune	 from	 such	 biases.	 After	 all,	 it	 seems	 that	 everybody	 is	 affected	 by	 biases	 to	some	 degree,	 irrespective	 of	 factors	 like	 general	 intelligence	 or	 open	 mindedness	(Stanovich	 and	 West	 2008).	 Though	 expertise	 in	 specific	 domains	 might	 have	 positive	effects	 on	 judgment	 and	 decision-making,	 some	 findings	 indicate	 that	 experienced	professionals	often	display	either	roughly	the	same	biases	as	college	students	or	the	same	biases	 at	 somewhat	 reduced	 levels.	 More	 precisely,	 psychological	 research	 has	demonstrated	 that	 a	 wide	 variety	 of	 biases	 often	 affect	 assessments	 that	 many	professionals,	 including	 physicians,	 investors,	 accountants,	 option	 traders,	 real	 estate	agents,	engineers,	and	psychologists,	are	trained	to	make	(e.g.,	McNeil	et	al.	1982;	Choi	and	Pritchard	2003;	Bazerman	et	al.	2002;	Fox	et	al.	1996).	More	recently,	it	has	been	shown	that	 also	 philosophers	 tend	 commit	 the	 very	 same	 biases	 (Schwitzgebel	 and	 Cushman	2012;	2015;	but	see	also	Livengood	et	al.	2010).	In	light	of	this,	 it	seems	highly	plausible	that	 when	 empirical	 philosophers	 search	 for	 and	 assess	 scholarly	 content,	 they	 can	 be	affected	by	these	biases.		In	the	context	of	literature	search	and	review,	reliance	on	heuristics	seems	quite	likely	to	occur,	 because	 of	 the	 increasing	 and	 huge	 amount	 of	 research	 materials	 published.	Herbert	Simon	claimed	that	‘human	rational	behavior	is	shaped	by	a	scissors	whose	blades	are	 the	 structure	 of	 task	 environments	 and	 the	 computational	 capabilities	 of	 the	 actor’	(1990,	 7).	Whilst	 an	 important	 generalization	 that	 comes	 out	 of	 efforts	 to	 study	 human	information	 processing	 is	 that	 an	 individual	 is	 a	 limited	 information	 processing	 system	(Newell	and	Simon,	1972),	it	is	also	the	case	that	researchers	have	to	face	a	rather	complex	environment	in	the	case	of	literature	search	and	review,	as	the	relevant	literature	is	huge	and	the	database	of	papers	and	noteworthy	content	is	not	only	massive	but	also	growing	fast	 (De	Solla	Price	1986;	Genova	et	al.	2016).	The	volume	of	 research	available	 in	most	fields	 is	 expanding	 rapidly	 and	 there	 has	 been	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 rate	 of	 outputs	publication,	 although	 it	 is	 less	 clear	 to	 what	 extent	 this	 might	 reflect	 an	 increase	 in	knowledge	 accumulation	 or	 rather	 a	 tendency	 to	 “slice”	 one	 research	 project	 into	 too	many	papers	(i.e.,	“salami	publishing”).	What	is	clearer,	instead,	is	that	in	light	of	people’s	memory	 and	 cognitive	 limitations,	 recall	 of	 huge	 amounts	 of	 relevant	 information	 and	literature	 might	 be	 far	 from	 optimal.	 Moreover,	 in	 light	 of	 people’s	 computational	limitations,	analyses	of	huge	databases	of	scholarly	content	might	also	be	far	from	optimal.		
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	Clearly,	 not	 all	 of	 the	 processes	 interfering	with	 the	 reliability	 of	 outcomes	 of	 literature	search	 and	 review	 need	 to	 be	 unconscious.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 abovementioned	unconscious	 biases,	 empirical	 philosophers	 could	 also	 be	 deliberately	 adopting	questionable	 strategies	 in	 processing	 the	 literature,	 resulting	 for	 instance	 in	 more	favorable	 treatment	 of	 close	 colleagues.	 Yet	 unconscious	 biases	 are	 particularly	worrisome,	 as	 they	 are	 hardly	 detected	 by	 the	 agent.	 Correction	 of	 distorting	 factors	seems	 harder	 to	 occur	 than	 one	 might	 think,	 and	 it	 has	 recently	 been	 suggested	 that	rationalization	 of	 biased	 choices	 or	 judgments	 might	 be	 common	 in	 the	 work	 of	philosophers	and	scientists	as	well	(Schwitzgebel	2016).			To	be	sure,	heuristics	do	not	just	lead	to	critical	biases.	In	some	contexts,	people	have	also	been	 shown	 to	 deploy	 heuristics	 that	 enable	 them	 to	 gather	 and	 assess	 information	effectively	(Gigerenzer	et	al.	2000)3.	Fast-and-frugal	heuristics	that	take	into	account	only	few	 cues	 and	 little	 of	 the	 available	 information	 might	 lead	 to	 accurate	 predictions	 and	estimates	in	a	number	of	contexts,	and	such	adaptive	heuristics	might	also	be	at	work	in	the	 context	 of	 literature	 search	 and	 review.	Whilst	 it	 is	 important	 not	 to	 overlook	 this	more	 positive	 view	 of	 our	 decision-making	 performance	 (Robins	 and	 Craik	 1993;	Christensen-Szalanski	and	Beach	1984;	Lopes	1991),	such	acknowledgment	should	not	be	read	as	being	at	odds	with	the	recognition	of	the	impact	of	the	abovementioned	biases.	In	addition,	 it	 is	 also	 unclear	 to	 what	 extent	 the	most	 plausible	 heuristics	 at	 work	 in	 this	context	could	be	successful.	The	most	prominent	cues	to	be	used	as	proxies	for	the	value	of	the	relevant	content	would	likely	be	the	number	of	articles’	citations,	the	Journal	Impact	Factor,	or	similar	metrics.	But	it	can	take	long	time	for	an	article	to	accumulate	citations,	meaning	that	it	is	hard	to	use	such	number	as	a	cue	to	identify	relevant	published	material.	Further,	 whilst	 it	 is	 sometimes	 argued	 that	 social	 media	 activity	 provides	 useful	indications	 for	 the	 future	 citations,	 recent	 research	 suggests	 that	 altmetrics	 are	 best	conceived	 of	 as	 measuring	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 research	 impact	 (Erdt	 et	 al.	 2016).		Moreover,	 the	 view	 that	 Journal	 Impact	 Factor	 as	 a	 reliable	 indicator	 of	 the	 quality	 of	journals	has	been	heavily	 criticized	 (e.g.,	Moustafa	2014)	and	a	number	of	 authors	have	pointed	 out	 that	 it	 does	 not	 necessarily	 correlate	 with	 several	 aspects	 of	 the	 journal’s	quality	(Brembs	et	al.	2013).			
																																																								3	Also,	Mercier	and	Sperber	(2011)	argue	that	biases	such	as	confirmation	can	be	adaptive	as	truth	might	not	be	the	relevant	goal	in	many	conversational	contexts.	Still,	in	case	of	scholarly	research,	relevant	goals	seem	to	be	epistemic	in	nature.		
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Overall,	there	are	good	reasons	to	carefully	consider	the	heuristics	and	biases	that	might	be	operating	in	the	context	of	 literature	search	and	review.	Because	of	these	factors,	and	especially	in	an	environment	characterized	by	growing	scholarly	production,	researchers	might	find	it	difficult	to	process	information	in	a	way	that	serves	well	and	furthers	goals	of	accuracy	and	truth.	But	if	common	research	practices	do	not	serve	these	goals	well,	then	this	should	look	like	a	worrying	situation	for	researchers.	The	question	arises	as	to	what	options	are	available	 to	remedy	 the	situation	described	above.	Arkes	et	al.	 (2006;	2010)	referred	 to	work	 on	 the	 inaccuracy	 of	 judgment	 and	 decision-making	 (e.g.,	 Dawes	 et	 al.	1989)	 to	 urge	 that	 we	 should	 “examine	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 more	 routinized,	 mechanical	method	 for	evaluating	scientific	materials	such	as	research	presentations	at	professional	conventions	 or	 proposals	 submitted	 to	 federal	 funding	 agencies”	 (2006,	 430).	 The	 next	section	examines	ways	to	improve	the	reliability	of	the	survey	of	research	materials	in	the	context	of	literature	reviews	by	appealing	to	systematic	methodologies.		
4.	Narrative	and	systematic	methods	for	literature	review		Biases	threaten	the	reliability	of	literature	search	and	review.	But	different	types	of	search	and	review	differ	in	terms	of	vulnerability.	In	philosophy,	as	well	as	in	many	other	fields	in	the	humanities,	 literature	search	and	review	is	typically	“narrative”	in	character	(but	see	Feltz	and	Cova	2014),	whereby	a	content	expert	writes	about	a	particular	topic	offering	a	comprehensive	 narrative	 synthesis	 of	 previously	 published	 materials,	 usually	 not	describing	the	methods	used	and	the	criteria	for	inclusion	and	review	of	the	literature.	In	brief,	 the	 authors	 of	 narrative	 reviews	 are	 free	 to	 include	 and	 exclude	 research	 as	 they	like,	and	they	are	free	in	their	evaluation	of	research	too.	As	an	example	of	this	approach,	consider	that	in	her	synthesis	of	the	literature	on	framing	effects,	Joanna	Demaree-Cotton	writes	the	following:	“I	have	included	all	relevant	studies	of	which	I	am	aware”	(2014,	9).	No	reference	 to	clear	objective	criteria	of	 inclusion	and	methods	used	 in	 the	selection	 is	provided	here.			Outside	philosophy,	however,	it	has	been	frequently	pointed	out	that	traditional	narrative	reviews,	 in	spite	of	some	clear	benefits,	are	also	prone	to	error	and	bias.	More	precisely,	whilst	 some	 researchers	 have	 suggested	 ways	 to	 reduce	 bias	 in	 literature	 search	 and	review	by	improving	traditional	narrative	approaches	to	review	(Baumeister	2013),	many	others	have	argued	that	more	rigorous	and	unbiased	types	of	analysis	should	be	offered	to	replace	 traditional	 narrative	 reviews	 (Kitsiou	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Templier	 and	 Pare	 2015).	 In	particular,	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 early	 1980s,	 scientists	 started	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	systematic	steps	needed	to	minimize	bias	and	random	errors	in	reviews	of	research	(Light	
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and	Smith	1971,	Glass	1976,	Rosenthal	1978,	Jackson	1980,	Cooper	1982).	In	this	context,	scientists	 appealed	 to	 systematic	 reviews	 as	 a	 useful	 tool	 to	 navigate	 through	 complex	bodies	of	literature	and	summarize	them	in	a	way	that	reduces	bias.	In	the	huge	literature	on	 systematic	 approaches	 to	 literature	 review,	 the	 adjective	 ‘systematic’	 is	 typically	contrasted	with	‘haphazard	study	selection	procedures’	or	even	‘arbitrary	study	selection	procedures’	(Slavin	1986,	6).			Systematic	 reviews	 typically	 address	 a	 question	 formulated	 in	 the	 Participants	(Population),	Intervention,	Comparisons,	Outcome	(PICO)	format.	The	question	identifies	a	 population,	 the	 intervention	 being	 investigated,	 a	 comparison	 point	 or	 points	 to	 the	intervention,	 and	 the	 outcome	 of	 interest	 (Higgins	 and	 Green,	 2011,	 section	 5.1.1).	 For	example,	 a	 researcher	 might	 ask,	 “for	 older	 adults	 with	 musculoskeletal	 disorders,	 is	home-based	 rehabilitation	 more	 effective	 than	 inpatient	 rehabilitation	 in	 relation	 to	function,	 cognition	 and	 quality	 of	 life?”	 (Stolee	 et	 al.	 2011).	 Equal	 emphasis	 on	 each	component	 of	 PICO	 is	 not	 necessary.	 For	 example,	 Shumway-Cook	 et	 al.	 (1997)	 address	“the	effect	of	multidimensional	exercises	on	balance,	mobility,	and	fall	risk	in	community-dwelling	 older	 adults”,	 referring	 to	 a	 population,	 outcome	 and	 effect,	 but	 not	 stating	 a	comparison	in	their	question.				On	the	framework	of	systematic	approaches	to	review,	the	criteria	used	to	select	studies	for	inclusion	should	be	clearly	stated,	alongside	the	bibliographic	databases	searched,	the	dates	 and	 periods	 searched	 and	 any	 constraints,	 such	 as	 language.	 In	 addition	 to	describing	 the	 search	 strategy,	 selection	and	data	 collection	process,	 systematic	 reviews	should	also	clearly	discuss	their	objectives.	Notably,	questions	of	systematic	reviews	might	be	quite	diverse	 in	 their	nature,	 and	 in	 the	medical	 field	 they	might	 for	 instance	seek	 to	explore	possible	harm	(e.g.,	will	there	be	any	negative	effects?),	prognosis	(e.g.,	what	is	the	likely	 outcome	 of	 this	 problem?),	 or	 etiology	 (e.g.,	 what	 causes	 this	 problem)	 of	 a	particular	effect.	Further,	systematic	reviews	may	ask	broader	or	narrower	questions,	and	it	 is	 generally	 important	 to	 strike	 a	 balance	 between	 comprehensiveness	 and	 precision	when	 developing	 a	 search	 strategy	 for	 a	 question.	 In	 brief,	 increasing	 the	comprehensiveness	of	a	search	might	result	in	reducing	its	precision	and	retrieving	more	irrelevant	 articles.	 It	 is	 also	 important	 to	 distinguish	 systematic	 reviews	 from	 meta-analyses:	only	when	results	are	mathematically	combined	(a	process	sometimes	referred	to	 as	 pooling),	 this	 is	 referred	 to	 as	 meta-analysis.	 As	 the	 Cochrane	 Collaboration	Handbook	 points	 out,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 systematic	 reviews	 “statistical	 methods	 (meta-
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analysis)	may	or	may	not	be	used	 to	 analyse	and	 summarise	 the	 results	of	 the	 included	studies”	(Higgins	and	Green	2011).4			The	 appeal	 of	 systematic	 reviews	 varies	 from	 field	 to	 field.	 In	 the	 health	 sciences,	systematic	 reviews	 have	 now	 become	 a	 standard	 and	 are	 well	 understood	 by	 all	contemporary	 practitioners.	 Three	 decades	 ago,	 Mulrow	 et	 al.	 lamented	 hat	 “medical	reviews	are	often	subjective,	unsound	and	inefficient”,	and	that	“strategies	for	identifying	and	selecting	information	are	rarely	defined”	(1987,	485).	But	things	changed	significantly	in	the	following	years	(Bracken	et	al.	2001).	In	other	fields,	instead,	systematic	reviews	are	still	not	mainstream.	For	example,	consider	the	field	of	psychology.		Narrative	methods	of	review	 have	 been	 dominant	 and	 widely	 taught	 for	 long	 time.	 Some	 researchers	encouraged	authors	of	reviews	“to	take	a	point	of	view	based	on	theory	and	offer	reads	a	point	 of	 view	 that	 integrates	 the	 review”	 (Sternberg	 1991,	 3).	 Currently,	 some	 journals,	like	Psychological	Bulletin,	 increasingly	 are	 publishing	 systematic	 reviews,	 while	 others,	such	 as	 Trends	 in	 Cognitive	 Sciences,	 still	 publish	 narrative	 reviews	 only,	 as	 does	 the	
Annual	Review	of	Psychology	too.			Further,	 different	 protocols	 for	 systematic	 reviews	 are	 typically	 followed	 in	 different	disciplines.	 Methods	 in	 environmental	 sciences	 and	 conservation	 are	 outlined	 by	 the	Collaboration	 for	 Environmental	 Evidence,	 in	 social	 sciences	 by	 the	 Campbell	Collaboration	 and	 in	medicine	 by	 the	 Cochrane	 Collaboration.	 Still,	 in	 all	 these	 different	fields,	systematic	review	methods	often	use	peer-reviewed	and	published	protocols	to	lay	out	 the	 methods	 for	 a	 review,	 and	 then	 searches	 for	 studies,	 articles	 screening	 for	relevance	 and	 quality,	 and	 data	 extraction	 and	 synthesis	 are	 typically	 undertaken	according	 to	a	predetermined	strategy.	 Importantly,	 irrespective	of	 the	specific	 layout	of	the	 systematic	 review,	 systematic	 reviews	 seem	 to	 differ	 from	 traditional	 narrative	reviews	by	virtue	of	being:		 Systematic/organized:	 Systematic	 reviews	 are	 conducted	 according	 to	 a	 system	 or	method	 that	 is	 designed	 in	 relation	 to	 and	 specifically	 to	 address	 the	 question	 the	review	is	setting	out	to	answer.	Transparent/explicit:	The	method	used	in	the	review	is	explicitly	stated.	
																																																								4	Hence,	objections	to	systematic	reviews	which	critique	their	application	of	statistical	methods	for	evidence	aggregation	will	not	be	discussed	here	(e.g.,	Stegenga	2011),	as	the	use	of	meta-analytic	tools	is	not	essential	to	the	argument	made	here.		
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Replicable/updatable:	As	with	many	 forms	of	primary	research,	 the	method	and	 the	way	it	is	reported	should	be	sufficiently	detailed	and	clear	such	that	other	researchers	can	repeat	the	review,	repeat	it	with	modifications	or	update	it.	Synthesize/summarize:	 Systematic	 reviews	 pull	 together	 in	 a	 structured	 and	organized	way	the	results	of	the	review	in	order	to	summarize	the	evidence	relating	to	the	review	question.		As	 it	 turns	 out,	whilst	 systematic	 reviews	might	 follow	different	 protocols	 and	 focus	 on	somewhat	different	questions,	they	are	nevertheless	supposed	to	incorporate	a	set	of	key	principles	of	 scientific	methodology	and	depart	 from	traditional	narrative	approaches	 to	literature	 review.	For	 instance,	 Cooper	nicely	 expresses	 the	 spirit	 behind	 the	 systematic	review	movement	in	the	introduction	to	his	book,	Synthesizing	Research:		 The	 approach	 to	 research	 synthesis	 presented	 in	 this	 book	 represents	 a	 significant	departure	 from	 how	 reviews	 had	 been	 conducted	 just	 20	 years	 ago.	 Instead	 of	 a	subjective,	narrative	approach,	 this	book	presents	an	objective	systematic	approach.	Here,	 the	 reader	will	 learn	how	 to	 carry	out	an	 integration	of	 research	according	 to	scientific	principles	and	rules.	The	intended	result	is	a	research	synthesis	that	can	be	replicated	by	others,	can	create	consensus	among	scholars,	and	can	focus	debate	in	a	constructive	fashion.	(Cooper	1998,	xi)		On	 one	 hand,	 it	 is	 obvious	 that	 systematic	 methodologies	 do	 not	 completely	 eliminate	subjectivity	 from	 the	 process	 of	 search	 review.	 After	 all,	 when	 the	 researchers	 try	 to	operationalize	 a	 research	 question,	 they	 are	 still	 called	 to	 make	 some	 decisions.	 For	instance,	 one	 still	 needs	 to	 define	what	 counts	 as	 older	 population.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	systematic	 literature	 reviews	 are	 undertaken	 according	 to	 strict	 guidelines	 to	minimize	subjectivity,	 maximize	 transparency	 and	 replicability,	 and	 are	 supposed	 to	 provide	 a	highly	reliable	review	of	evidence	pertaining	to	a	specific	topic.	The	scientific	method	has	the	invaluable	benefit	of	affording	a	systematic	and	unbiased	investigation,	and	systematic	reviews	apply	it	to	the	practice	of	literature	search	of	review.	Systematic	methods	aim	at	making	 literature	 search	 and	 review	 objective:	 the	 reasoning	 is	 that	 subjectivity	 is	 a	source	of	bias,	 and	one	 that	 can	and	must	be	minimized	by	developing	a	 clear	protocol,	making	all	the	steps	and	the	criteria	explicit,	following	these	steps	and	documenting	all	the	relevant	 activity.	 By	 so	 doing	 one	 is	 likely	 to	 maximize	 the	 chances	 of	 producing	 valid	conclusions,	and	also	makes	the	review	replicable.	It	should	be	noted,	here,	that	the	use	of	the	 concept	 “objective”	 is	 eminently	 complicated,	 as	 also	 recent	 philosophical	 (e.g.,	Douglas	2004)	and	historical	(e.g.,	Daston	and	Galison,	2010)	analyses	demonstrate.	But	in	general	 the	 objectivity	 of	 results	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 method	 being	objective.			
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Another	important	aspect	to	highlight	is	that	systematic	reviews	are	typically	conducted	in	a	 team.	Ensuring	that	 tasks	such	as	selection	of	studies	 for	 inclusion	and	data	extraction	can	 be	 performed	 by	 at	 least	 two	 people	 independently	 may	 increase	 the	 chance	 that	errors	 and	 biases	 be	 detected.	 Importantly,	 at	 least	 when	 considering	 biases	 like	confirmation,	 there	 is	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 groups	 perform	 better	 than	 single	individuals.	More	precisely,	although	groups	in	some	contexts	do	fall	prey	to	some	of	the	errors	 made	 by	 the	 single	 individual,	 for	 many	 important	 biases	 such	 as	 confirmation,	groups	 outperform	 individuals	 (Maciekoskj	 et	 al.	 2013),	 and	 there	 is	 not	 evidence	 that	single	individuals	outperform	groups.			Still,	some	have	expressed	qualms	about	using	these	methodologies.	Whilst	it	is	frequently	argued	that	the	“the	use	of	explicit,	systematic	methods	in	reviews	limits	bias	(systematic	errors)	 and	 reduces	 chance	 effects,	 thus	 providing	more	 reliable	 results	 upon	which	 to	draw	conclusions	and	make	decisions	(Antman	1992,	Oxman	1993)”	(Higgins	and	Green	2011),	one	possible	objection	is	that	peer	review	would	in	any	case	wash	out	researchers’	biases,	eventually	leading	to	reliable	surveys	of	the	literature.	This,	however,	seems	to	rely	on	too	romantic	a	view	of	peer	review,	and	one	with	several	problems.	Whilst	peer	review	typically	brings	a	measure	of	rigor	and	trust	to	scholarly	communication,	the	reliability	of	peer-review	 is	 far	 from	 optimal,	 and	 several	 biases	 in	 peer	 review	 have	 also	 been	identified		(Lee	et	al.	2013;	Lee	2015;	Shalvi	et	al.	2010).	There	are	well	known	cases	of	so-called	 Mendel	 syndrome,	 mentioned	 after	 Gregor	 Mendel,	 whose	 discoveries	 in	 plant	genetics	were	so	unprecedented	that	it	took	thirty-four	years	for	the	scientific	community	to	catch	up	to	it	(Van	Raan	2004;	Gorry	and	Ragouet	2016).	Moreover,	obvious	failures	of	peer	review	have	also	been	clearly	documented	(Hawkes	2013).	Even	more	 importantly,	the	very	 fact	 that	systematic	reviews	and	narrative	reviews	have,	at	 least	 in	some	cases,	been	shown	to	deliver	results	that	are	at	odds	suggests	that	pointing	to	peer	review	as	a	silver	bullet	might	be	an	unwarranted	move.	For	instance,	De	Dreu	and	Weingart	(2003)	show	in	a	systematic	review	that	the	relationship	between	task	conflict,	team	performance	and	team	satisfaction	is	largely	negative	even	though	both	academic	papers	and	textbooks	regularly	report	that	task	conflict	has	a	generally	positive	effect.	Moreover,	consider	also	that	whilst	it	is	typically	claimed	in	the	literature	that	reasoning	errors	have	severe	impact	in	terms	of	wealth5,	recent	systematic	literature	searches	show	limited	evidence	that	these	errors	would	cause	actual	harm	in	terms	of	less	wealth	(Arkes	et	al.	2015).																																																										5	For	example,	Milkman	et	al.	write	that	“errors	induced	by	biases	in	judgment	lead	decision	makers	to	undersave	for	retirement	[…].	Given	the	massive	costs	that	can	result	from	suboptimal	decision-making,	 it	 is	 critical	 for	 our	 field	 to	 focus	 increased	 effort	 on	 improving	 our	 knowledge	 about	strategies	that	can	lead	to	better	decisions”	(2009,	379).	
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		Other	 critics	 of	 systematic	 reviews	 argue	 that	 a	 major	 threat	 to	 systematic	 reviews	 is	dissemination	bias,	often	referred	to	as	publication	bias,	and	which	describes	the	selective	publication	and	dissemination	of	 results.	 In	 this	 situation,	published	studies	 constitute	a	biased	sample	leading	to	spurious	conclusions.	Published	research	can	then	be	shaped	by	file-drawer	effects	(Rosenthal	1979).	Again,	this	does	not	read	as	a	knockdown	objection,	and	 at	 least	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 whilst	 systematic	 reviews	 might	 not	 solve	 these	problems,	narrative	reviews	do	not	seem	to	be	obviously	better	positioned	at	dealing	with	them.	An	argument	would	be	needed	to	support	this	claim.	Second,	it	actually	seems	that	the	methods	of	systematic	reviews	can	also	be	applied	to	the	grey	 literature	as	well.	For	instance,	 these	 methods	 can	 be	 applied	 to	 doctoral	 dissertations	 as	 well	 as	 conference	proceedings.	 Overall,	 publication	 bias	 is	 clearly	 an	 important	 problem	 that	 the	 research	community	and	research	gatekeepers	need	to	address,	but	also	one	which	is	orthogonal	to	the	debate	over	the	merits	of	narrative	and	systematic	reviews.				Where	does	all	this	lead	us?	The	thrust	of	the	section	is	not	to	argue	that	narrative	reviews	should	 be	 replaced	 by	 systematic	 reviews	 tout	 court.	 Arguably,	 narrative	 reviews	 have	important	benefits,	including	a	broad	overview	of	relevant	information	tempered	by	years	of	knowledge	from	an	experienced	author.	It	is	also	true	that	the	narrative	thread	can	be	lost	in	the	strict	rules	of	systematic	review,	which	might	hinder	the	piece’s	readability.	As	it	 turns	 out,	 the	 benefits	 of	 appealing	 to	 a	 particular	 approach	 might	 depend	 on	 the	specific	situation.	For	instance,	Baumeister	points	out	that	in	some	cases:		 A	 narrative	 rather	 than	 a	meta-analytic	 review	 suits	 this	 purpose,	 in	 the	 interest	 of	presenting	 a	 richer	 description	 of	 the	 prejudice-reduction	 literature.	 Moreover,	 the	methods,	interventions,	and	dependent	variables	are	so	diverse	that	meta-analysis	is	potentially	meaningless	(Baumeister	and	Leary	1997;	see	also	Hafer	and	Begue	2005),	especially	given	that	many	of	the	research	designs	used	in	this	literature	are	prone	to	bias,	rendering	their	findings	unsuitable	for	meta-analysis.		The	point	 that	 this	 section	 seeks	 to	drive	home	 is	 that	 systematic	 approaches	 to	 review	should	 at	 least	 be	 seen	 as	 important	 complements	 to	 traditional	 methods	 of	 literature	search	 and	 review,	 as	 the	 former	 are	 better	 placed	 at	 reducing	 bias	 and	 increasing	reproducibility.	 Although	 there	 is	 often	 some	 tension	 between	 the	 users	 of	 the	 two	methods,	and	some	experts	who	favour	systematic	analyses	disdain	narrative	approaches	as	obsolete,	both	methods	could	actually	have	a	valuable	place	in	science.				
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5.	Systematic	reviews	for	empirical	philosophers	It	has	been	shown	that	systematic	reviews	are	methodologies	widely	employed	in	natural,	life	and	health	sciences,	and	that	they	offer	important	tools	to	minimize	bias	and	increase	transparency	 and	 reproducibility.	 Since	 empirical	 philosophers	 are	 also	 likely	 to	 be	affected	by	critical	biases	in	the	process	of	literature	search	and	review,	it	seems	tempting	to	 conclude	 that	 they	 should	 also	 carefully	 consider	 these	 tools.	 This	 might	 seem	 too	ambitious	a	goal	to	be	taken	seriously,	but	the	adoption	of	systematic	tools	would	fit	just	nicely	 with	 some	 recent	 trends	 in	 philosophy	 to	 employ	 new	 tools	 to	 improve	 their	appraisal	 of	 scholarly	 literature.	 A	 number	 of	 philosophers	 have	 already	 adopted	conceptual	 and	 technical	 tools	 from	digital	humanities	 (e.g.,	Andow	2015;	Betti	 and	Van	Der	Berg	2016)	and	bibliometrics	(Knobe	2015;	Machery	and	Cohen	2012;	Wray	2010)	to	improve	 the	 reliability	 of	 their	 assessments	 of	 the	 literature.	 Embracing	 systematic	methodologies	would	just	be	a	natural	extension	of	this	 laudable	trend.	 It	should	also	be	mentioned	 that	 systematic	 methodologies	 for	 review	 have	 already	 been	 introduced	 in	some	areas	of	the	humanities,	speaking	in	favor	of	the	feasibility	of	the	suggestions	offered	in	 this	 paper.	 Consider	 some	 recent	 trends	 in	 the	 field	 of	 bioethics.	 It	 has	 been	 argued	there	 that	 bioethics	would	benefit	 from	 “the	 corrective	 effect	 of	 review	articles	 that	 are	designed	 to	 reduce	 the	 potential	 for	 bias	 in	 the	 conclusions	 drawn”	 (McCullough	 et	 al.	2007,	 66).	 More	 precisely,	 in	 bioethics	 systematic	 methods	 have	 been	 applied	 to	 both	empirical	(Strech	et	al.	2007)	and	reason-based	(Stretch	and	Sofaer	2012)	literature.				A	 shift	 towards	 systematic	 methodologies	 would	 offer	 important	 benefits	 for	 empirical	philosophers.	 An	 example	 might	 illustrate	 this.	 In	 a	 paper	 recently	 published	 in	
Philosophical	 Psychology,	 Smithdeal	 (2016)	 reviewed	 empirical	 evidence	 allegedly	suggesting	that	belief	 in	free	will	 is	beneficial.	His	review	was	narrative	 in	character	and	he	appealed	 to	 some	 sources	 suggesting	 that	belief	 in	 free	will	 is	 a	 valuable	 support	 for	prosocial	behavior	(Vohs	and	Schooler	2008;	Baumeister	et	al.	2009)	and	then	criticised	some	studies	pointing	to	possible	detrimental	effects	of	belief	in	free	will	(Nadelhoffer	and	Tocchetto	2013).	However,	narrative	reviews,	as	mentioned	above,	are	hardly	updatable	and	 reproducible.	 It	 turns	 out	 that,	 besides	 the	 referenced	 sources	 suggesting	 that	disbelief	 in	 freewill	 is	 linked	 with	 a	 decreased	 willingness	 to	 help	 others,	 some	 other	relevant	studies	examining	how	free	will	beliefs	 influence	 true	self-knowledge	(Seto	and	Hicks	2016)	could	have	been	included.	Readers	struggle	to	understand	why	or	how	such	sources	were	excluded.	Further,	relevant	studies	have	been	published	after	the	publication	of	Smithdeal’s	paper.	Notably,	Caspar	et	al.	(2017)	provided	further	evidence	that	disbelief	in	free	will	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	morality	of	decisions	toward	others.	A	systematic	
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review	would	here	give	readers	clear	answers	as	to	why	some	seemingly	relevant	papers	were	excluded	as	well	 as	 indications	on	 the	extent	of	 the	 literature	 covered,	 in	 terms	of	period,	databases	and	journals	considered.		Among	 the	 reasons	 why	 empirical	 philosophers	 should	 appreciate	 the	 value	 of	 such	systematic	 tools	 is	 also	 that	 systematic	 reviews	 have	 already	 delivered	 results	 at	 odds	with	 a	 few	 theses	widely	 accepted	 in	 empirical	 philosophy.	 As	 a	 case	 in	 point,	 consider	that	 philosophers	 have	 widely	 embraced	 the	 assumption	 that	 emotions	 and	 affective	processes	 cause	 moral	 judgment.	 For	 instance,	 philosopher	 Joshua	 May	 writes	 that	“scientists	have	apparently	amassed	converging	evidence	that	emotions	play	a	substantial	role	in	the	production	of	most,	if	not	all,	of	our	moral	judgments”	(2014,	125).		But	Landy	and	Goodwin’s	(2015;	see,	however,	also	Schnall	et	al.	2015)	offer	a	systematic	review	in	which	they	“argue	against	some	claims	about	the	role	of	affect	in	moral	judgments”	(518).	In	addition,	while	it	is	typically	accepted	in	the	philosophical	literature	that	“psychological	life	occurs	through	nonconscious	means	(Bargh	and	Chatrand	1999)”	(Fridland	2015,	4),	recent	systematic	reviews	cast	doubt	on	much	research	on	social	priming	on	which	these	claims	often	are	based	(Kuehberger	et	al.	2016).	Exploring	whether	conclusions	typically	reached	 via	 narrative	 literature	 reviews	 would	 stand	 in	 light	 of	 the	 application	 of	systematic	tools	seems	an	important	task	for	empirical	philosophers,	and	one	in	line	with	the	mission	of	critically	appraising	scientific	projects.			Still,	 a	 possible	 objection	 is	 that	 empirical	 philosophers	 should	 let	 scientists	 review	empirical	 literature	 systematically,	 and	 simply	 rely	 on	 the	 results	 of	 their	 systematic	analyses.	There	are	some	problems	with	this	claim,	though.	First,	this	rejoinder	would	still	acknowledge	 that	 philosophers	 should	 pay	 close	 attention	 to	 results	 obtained	 via	systematic	methods,	 and	 just	 rejects	 the	 claim	 that	 philosophers	 should	 actively	 deploy	such	 methods.	 In	 other	 words,	 philosophers	 should	 still	 appreciate	 that	 systematic	reviews	 would	 constitute	 a	 privileged	 source	 of	 evidence	 to	 use	 in	 their	 philosophical	work.	 Second,	 it	 also	 seems	 that	 by	 engaging	 directly	 with	 systematic	 methodologies,	philosophers	would	disengage	 in	part	 from	the	agenda	of	particular	sciences,	and	would	be	 able	 to	 contribute	 to	 redirect	 it	 towards	 topics	 that	 are	 especially	 important	 to	philosophers.	 More	 precisely,	 there	 are	 plenty	 of	 topics	 that	 are	 of	 great	 interest	 to	philosophers	and	that	could	be	target	of	systematic	methodologies.	Imagine	an	empirical	philosopher	 interested	 in	 exploring	 whether	 conscious	 decision-making	 leads	 to	 better	outcomes	 than	 non-conscious	 one:	 being	 able	 to	 properly	 apply	 systematic	 tools	would	greatly	help	her	in	her	philosophical	work.	Instead,	by	relying	passively	on	the	syntheses	
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provided	 by	 scientists,	 philosophers	 would	 risk	 failing	 to	 adequately	 answer	 questions	that	 have	 been	 traditionally	 central	 in	 their	 disciplines.	 Further,	 experimental	philosophers	have	also	produced	empirical	work	themselves,	and	they	should	be	able	 to	review	their	findings	systematically,	instead	of	expecting	non-philosophers	to	accomplish	the	task	for	them.			The	 upshot	 of	 this	 section	 is	 that	 there	 are	 not	 obvious	 reasons	 why	 empirical	philosophers	 should	 not	 adopt	 systematic	 approaches	 to	 literature	 search	 and	 review.	Naturalist	philosophers	should	be	highly	interested	in	systematic	reviews,	as	this	is	a	key	tool	 used	 in	 many	 scientific	 disciplines.	 Further,	 empirically	 minded	 philosophers	 and	philosophers	 of	 science	 may	 also	 notice	 that	 the	 suggestion	 to	 expand	 their	methodological	toolkit	to	include	systematic	approaches	fits	quite	nicely	with	some	other	proposals	already	put	 forward	by	philosophers	 to	minimize	bias	and	error	and	 improve	our	understanding	of	the	literature.			
6.	Conclusion	In	summary,	this	essay	has	attempted	to	highlight	and	discuss	some	overlooked	problems	with	the	methodology	of	naturalistic	philosophy	and	to	point	to	solutions	that	might	help	overcome	 them.	More	 precisely,	 it	 has	 firstly	 been	 stressed	 that	 empirical	 philosophers	have	not	adequately	reflected	on	the	obvious	and	yet	important	fact	that	literature	search	and	review	are	 likely	 to	be	affected	by	widespread	and	systematic	biases.	This	has	been	shown	to	be	highly	worrying,	as	empirical	philosophers	do	not	typically	philosophize	in	a	vacuum,	and	in	fact	seem	to	rely	on	literature	search	and	review	in	a	number	of	ways	and	for	 several	 purposes.	 The	 suggested	 solution	 to	 tackle	 these	 problems	 comes	 from	scientific	 disciplines.	 Whilst	 naturalistic	 philosophers	 have	 recently	 started	 to	 look	 at	methods	 and	 tools	 from	 the	 sciences	 to	 expand	 their	 methodological	 toolkit	 and	 offer	philosophy	 better	 chances	 of	 accomplishing	 its	 goals,	 it	 turns	 out	 that	 the	 tradition	 of	systematic	reviews	of	literature	from	scientific	disciplines	has	been	unduly	neglected.	But	systematic	 reviews	 are	 important	 tools	 that	minimize	bias	 and	 allow	 for	 reproducibility	and	transparency.	The	upshot	of	this	investigation	is	that,	if	naturalistic	philosophers	wish	to	reduce	bias	in	philosophy,	as	it	is	here	assumed	that	they	should,	they	should	consider	ways	 to	 supplement	 their	 traditional	 tools	 for	 literature	 search	and	 review	by	 including	systematic	reviews.		
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